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NOTES
sales of immovable property was apparently made to depend
upon what the viewer saw or could have seen; a prior viewing
did not automatically convert the sale to one per aversionem.
According to the instant case, there must be visible markers
of some sort to indicate the location of the boundaries before
it can be inferred that the buyer intended to buy the property
per aversionem with negligible regard for its areal extent. Ar-
ticle 2495 sets forth a mechanical test, dependent upon easily
ascertainable factors, for determining whether a sale is per
aversionem. Injection of the question whether the buyer viewed
the property in order to classify the sale injects his actual intent
and displaces the rigid requirements of the Code. However, if
the use of this consideration is to continue, limiting the effect
of the buyer's viewing to what he saw or should have seen should
at least limit the degree of variance from the exacting require-
ments for a sale per aversionem contained in the Civil Code.
Allen L. Smith, Jr.
TORTS--NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED MENTAL ANGUISH OCCASIONED
BY INJURY TO ANOTHER
Plaintiffs sought damages for mental anguish suffered when
their child became violently ill from having eaten rat poison
placed in their home by defendant exterminator; they alleged
that they could not secure a reliable antidote because the ex-
terminator was unable to identify the poison's ingredients. The
district court dismissed on exception of no cause of action. The
court of appeal reversed and remanded.' Held, although gen-
erally one may not recover for mental anguish resulting from
injury to another, plaintiffs stated a cause of action in this
case since the exterminator owed a duty directly to them, in-
dependently of any duty owed their child, to be able to inform
them within a reasonable time of the ingredients of the poison
used in their home. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co.,
135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961).
However, when he cannot see, by buildings, or fences, or other marks or monu-
ments just what the boundaries of the property are, it may be said that he is
influenced by-the surface area or by the measurements .... " 134 So. 2d at 682.
1. The father also sued for the child's benefit for injuries allegedly sustained
from eating the poison. The jury, however, ruled for defendants, and that claim
was not appealed.
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It is generally recognized that' recovery may'be had for
mental/ anguish occasioned by intentional misconduct.2 .When
mental anguish results from negligence, however, the courts are
reluctant to allow recovery, apparently on the rationale that
to do so would foster a multiplicity of suits and expose defend-
ants to false and excessive claims. Also, many of the early cases
dealt with traffic accidents, and the courts probably felt that
to allow damages for negligently inflicted mental anguish would
unduly burden traffic and transportation.8 These considerations
apparently prompted the courts to formulate two general limi-
tations on recovery of damages for negligently inflicted mental
anguish. First, there can be no recovery for mental anguish
unattended by physical manifestations thereof. 4 Thus, no re-
covery is allowed for the mere unpleasant sensation of fright.5
2. See PR0SSER, TORTS § 11 (2d ed. 1955). Such recoveries may be categorized
in three general groups. The first involves mental anguish considered in award-
ing damages for other intentional torts. Deevy v. Tassi, 21 Cal.2d 109, 130 P.2d
389 (1942) (assault and battery) ; Crowley v. New Orleans Brewing Co., 180
So. 232 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1938) (trespass) ; Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va.
741, 164 S.E. 535 (1932) (slander) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 47(2) (amend-
ments and additions, 1950), 905 (1939) ; 25 C.J.S., Damages § 63 (1941). The
second is based on the intentional acts of common carriers. Southeastern Grey-
hound Corp. v. Graham, 69 Ga. App. 621, 26-S.E.2d 371 (1943) (threatening
and abusive language) ; Haile v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 135 La. 229,
65 So. 225 (1914) (called plaintiff "a big fat woman"); Medlin v. Southern
R.R., 143 S.C. 91, 141 S.E. 185 (1928) (deliberately overcharged and insulted
passenger) ; 13 C.J.S., Carriers § 692 (1939). The third group embraces those
miscellaneous situations in which the essential element of the wrong is the out-
rageousness of the defendant's act. Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37
(1920) (famous "pot of gold" case) ; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Roch,
160 Md. 189, 153 Atl. 22 (1931) (defendant wrapped up rat in package of
groceries); Wilkinson v. Downton, 2 Q.B.D. 57 (1897) (defendant. falsely told
plaintiff that her husband had suffered serious injury); Magruder, Mental and
Emotional Disturbances in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936)
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MIcH. L.
REv. 874 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 46 (amendments and additions, 1950).
Frequently such cases involve abusive methods of collection of debt. E.g., Bar-
nett v. Collection- Service Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932) ; Grandeson
v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 223 La. 504, 66 So. 2d 317 (1953);
Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) ; Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d
558 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273
S.W.2d 64 .(1954) ; 66 U.S. L. REv. 349 (1932).3. For a resum6 of the development of the law in this area, see Annots., 64
A.L.R.2d 100 (1959), 18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951).
4. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944)
Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App.2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952)
Holland v. Good Bros., 318 Mass. 300, 61 N.E.2d 544 (1945) ; Kaufman v.
Israel Zion Hospital, 183 Misc. 714, 51 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1944) ; Gulf C. & S.F.
Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894) ; 52 AM JuR., Torts § 45 (1944);
Annots., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 117 (1959), 18 A.L.R.2d 220, 224 (1951) ; RESTATE-
MEINT, TORTS § 47 (amendments and additions, 1950).
5. See Gulf"C. & S.F. Ry. v. Trott, 86 Tex. 412, 25 S.W. 419 (1894). How-
ever, when. the mental anguish is so severe that it is evidenced by deleterious
physical ,consequences most jurisdictions do allow a cause of action. Central of
Georgia Ry. v. Kimber, 212 Ala, 102, 101 So. 827 (1924) (injury to nervous
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Second, even if mental anguish is evidenced by physical mani-
festations, no recovery is allowed when it is occasioned by in-
jury or fear of injury to another.6
Since the courts in adhering to these general limitations
appear to have been motivated by the policy considerations of
keeping false claims out of court and protecting the social in-
system) ; Hanford v. Omaha & Council Bluffs Street Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N.W.
643 (1925) (miscarriage) ; Kenny v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 Atl. 343
(1925) (became "sick" upon finding dead mouse in mouth) ; Battalla v. State,
10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) ("severe emotional and
neurological disturbances with residual physical manifestations") ; Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 100, 143 (1959). While it may be argued that such damages are
allowed for the physical consequences of the mental anguish and not the mental
anguish itself (note the language of RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 313 (1934)), it
would seem that in either event the result is the same. The former view was
that man had separate faculties for "mental" and "physical" functions, but cur-
rently the human being is thought to be an essentially indivisible unit with its
mental and physical functions interacting closely at all times. Hence, the deter-
mination of whether injuries are of a "physical" or a "mental" nature seems
merely an exercise in choosing terms, since neither is adequately descriptive.
See Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 104 (1959).
Formerly, even when there were physical manifestations of mental distress,
recovery was denied unless the infliction of mental anguish was accompanied by a
contemporaneous physical "impact." Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass.
285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) ; Ward v. West Jersey & S. R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Atl.
561 (1900) ; Mitchel v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896);
Miller v. Baltimore & 0. S.W. R.R., 78 Ohio St. 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908). See
Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 100, 134 (1959). During the transitional years the impact
requirement became only symbolic as even very slight touchings were sufficient
to permit recovery. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian,:
232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929) (electric shock); Porter v. Delaware,
L. & W. R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 Atl. 860 (1906) (dust in the eye) ; Morton v.
Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke) ; Clark
Restaurant Co. v. Rau, 41 Ohio App. 23, 179 N.E. 196 (1931) (swallowed small
particles of glass).
It should also be noted that it is the well-accepted rule that mental anguish
may be considered in assessing the damages to be awarded in conjunction with a
physical injury inflicted other than through the medium of mental suffering,
generally through direct physical impact. Buch v. United States, 220 F.2d 165
(2d Cir. 1955) (mental agony from paralysis resulting from fall) ; Thompson v.
Lupone, 135 Conn. 236, 62 A.2d 861 (1948) (anxiety for future due to physical
injury); Thompson v. Minnis, 201 Okla. 154, 202 P.2d 981 (1949) (mental.
anguish resulting from physical suffering of hunger and deprivation of a place to
sleep due to defendant's negligent act) ; Rosen v. Yellow Cab Co., 262 Pa. Super.
58, 56 A.2d 398 (1948) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 47(2) (amendments and addi-
tions, 1950) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 37 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark.
1959); Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956) ; Resavage
v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) ; Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C.
498, 112 S.E.2d 48 (1960) ; Smith v. Incorporated Village of Plandome, 213
N.Y.S.2d 119 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Van Hoy v. Oklahoma Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
205 Okla. 135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951) ; Bedard v. Notre Dame Hospital, 89 R.I.
195, 151 A.2d 690 (1959); Nuckles v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 155 Tenn.
611, 299 S.W. 775 (1927) ; Carey v. Pure Distributing Corp., 133 Tex. 31, 124
S.W.2d 847 (1939) ; Venske v. Johnson-Lieber Co., 47 Wash.2d 511, 288 P.2d
249 (1955) ; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) ; Annot.,
18.A.L.R.2d 220 (1951); 15 AM. JuR., Damages § 180 (1938) ; Note, 21 LA.
L.. REv. 858 (1961).
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terest in traffic and transportation, it is understandable that
some exceptions have developed where there is sufficient reason
to believe that the mental anguish is genuine and that the in-
terest in transportation is not affected. Thus, a few jurisdic-
tions have permitted recovery for mental anguish, unattended
by physical consequences, 7 caused by desecration of corpses or
interference with burial places," and by faulty transmission of
telegraph messages.9
Although Louisiana decisions contain broad statements to
the effect that mental anguish unattended by physical conse-
quences can give rise to a cause of action,10 recovery has gen-
erally been confined to the instances in which it is allowed in
common law states.1 Louisiana has allowed recovery for mental
7. A number of states, through interpretation of wrongful death statutes, also
allow damages for mental anguish occasioned by negligently inflicted death. Steele
v. Miami Transit Co., 160 Fla. 363, 34 So. 2d 530 (1948) ; Wolfe v. Lockhart,
195 Va. 479, 78 S.E.2d 654 (1953) ; HARPER & JAMES, ToRTs § 24.1 (1956) ; Annot.,
74 A.L.R. 11 (1931). Louisiana courts interpret LA. CIVIL ConE art. 2315 (1870)
to reach the same result. See Silverman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 277 F.2d 257 (5th
Cir. 1960) Thompson v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 148 La. 698, 87 So.
716 (1921) Underwood v. Gulf Refining Co., 28 La. 968, 55 So. 641 (1911)
(gives background and development of the statute in France and Louisiana);
Freeman v. United States Casualty Co., 88 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956).
8. St. Louis Southeastern Ry. v. White, 192 Ark. 350, 91 S.W.2d 277 (1936) ;
Carey v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181
(1959) ; Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278 (1908). However, it
appears that most jurisdictions require that recovery be based on intentional or
wanton misconduct, or breach of contract. See 25 C.J.S., Dead Bodies § 8
(1941) 15 AM. JuR., Dead Bodies § 35 (1938).
9. The message has generally had to do with the death or approaching death
of a family member. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cleveland, 169 Ala. 131,
53 So. 80 (1910) ; Mentzer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62
N.W. 1 (1895) ; Alexander v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 158 N.C. 473, 74
S.E. 449 (1912). While some of the telegraph cases allow recovery on a tort
basis, the majority seem decided on a contract theory.
10. E.g., Quina v. Roberts, 16 So. 2d 558, 561 (La. App. Or]. Cir. 1944),
wherein it was said: "Article 231.5 of our Code is broad in its scope and con-
templates redress to all who suffer injury as a consequence of the commission of
an offense or quasi offense. This includes recovery for mental pain and anguish
for which compensatory damages will be awarded even though unaccompanied by
physical injury." As in most instances in which such statements are made, the
suit in this case was for damages occasioned by intentional misconduct and not
negligence.
11. Other than the instances discussed below, no Louisiana cases were found
actually allowing recovery where recovery would not also have been allowed in
the more liberal common law jurisdictions.
In Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. Or.
Cir. 1951), recovery was allowed a husband for mental anguish and worry that
his unborn child bad sustained injuries and that there might be an abortion be-
cause of negligent injury to his wife. However, it appears that the principal
issues discussed were whether the wife could recover for aggravation of her phys-
ical diseases and ailment and for her child's having been stillborn; the husband's
claim appeared to be a subsidiary issue and was not given serious consideration
by the court. Accord, Jordan v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 90 So. 2d 531 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1956), in which the court again treated allowance of damages to the
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anguish unaccompanied by physical manifestations when caused
by negligent desecration of a corpse12 and faulty transmission
of a telegraph message. 13 But prior to the instant case the rule
precluding recovery for mental anguish occasioned by injury
or fear of injury to another has been rigidly applied.14
husband as a subordinate issue. Valence was cited as authority.
It is also said in Louisiana decisions that recovery is allowed for mental
anguish unaccompanied by physical manifestations when caused by unintentional
invasions of property interests. Fontenot v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 227 La.
866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955) ; McGee v. Yazoo & M.V. R.R., 206 La. 121, 19 So. 2d
21 (1944) ; Holmes v. LeCour Corp., 99 So. 2d 467 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958).
However, it should be noted that, except in Holmes, recovery was not based on
invasion of a protected interest in the person (since no act was committed against
the person), but on the basis of invasion of an interest in property. Consequent-
ly, the action is 'brought for discomfort and inconvenience rather than for what
is popularly termed "mental distress and anguish." Damages of this nature have
long been held recoverable at common law. E.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ruble,
191 Okla. 37, 126 P. 2d 526 (1942) ; Louisville & Terminal Co. v. Jacobs, 109
Tenn. 727, 72 S.W. 954 (1902) (circumstances very similar to the Yazoo case).
See generally 39 AM. JuR., Nuisances § 136 (1942) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 73 (2d
ed. 1955). In Holmes the court stated that recovery was based on a personal
injury and allowed recovery for mental anguish, although maintaining that if it
were not for the jurisprudence establishing a right to recover in such instances,
it would have felt constrained to refuse such damages. It is submitted that re-
covery could have been granted on the basis of inconvenience as in the common
law states, provided, of course, that inconvenience could have been proven.
There is considerable authority, however, that injuries to mental feelings may
be the subject of damages in some instances when it results from breach of con-
tract. LA. CivIL CODE art. 1934(3) (1870) provides in part that "where the con-
tract has for its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether
in religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification,
although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet damages are due
for their breach ...." See Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d
189 (1945) ; Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n, 191 La.
803, 186 So. 342 (1939) ; Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43 So. 46 (1907);
Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 91 (1903) ; Lewis
v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) ; Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, Inc., 61 So. 2d 539 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1952) ; Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 175 So. 116 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937) indicates that
in order to recover it must appear that injury to the mental feeling could reason-
ably be anticipated by the parties at the time of the contract. Baker v. Stamps,
82 So. 2d 858 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) and Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So. 2d 389
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) indicate that, as to suits for breach of building con-
tracts due to defects in construction, the provisions of Article 1934 requiring the
object of the contract to be for the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment,
etc., may be narrowly applied.
12. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
13. Graham v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So. 291 (1903).
14. Grier v. Tri-State Transit Co., 36 F. Supp. 26 (W.D. La. 1940) ;Brink-
man v. St. Landry Cotton Oil Co., 118 La. 835, 43 So. 458 (1907) ; Sperier v.
Ott, 116 La. 1087, 41 So. 323 (1906) ; Honeycutt v. American General Ins. Co.,
126 So. 2d 789 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961) ; Covey v. Marquette Cas. Co., 84 So. 2d
217 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1956) ; Hughes v. Gill, 41 So.2d 536 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1949) ; Davies v. Consolidated Underwriters, 14 So. 2d 494 (La. App. 2d Cir..
1943); Seligman v. Holladay, 154 So. 481 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934) ; Sherwood
v. Tieheli, 10 La. App. 280, 120 So. 107 (2d Cir. 1929) ; Alston v. Cooley, 5 La.
App.. 623 (1st Cir. 1927) ; Barrere v. Schuber, 5 La. App. 67 (Orl. Cir. 1927);
Knox v. Allen, 4- La. App. 223 (2d Cir. 1926).
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* While recognizing the general principle that precludes re-
covery for mental anguish occasioned by injury to another,
the court in the instant case held that the principle does not
apply when one sues on "the basis of a breach of a primary
legal duty . . . owed by the defendant directly to the plaintiff
seeking such damages."'15 The court reasoned that exterminators
owe such a primary legal duty to householders to know the com-
ponents of the poisons employed on their premises and thus are
liable for mental anguish resulting from a breach of such duty,
even though the mental anguish is occasioned by injury to a
third person.
That one may recover for mental anguish occasioned by
injury to another when the duty breached is a "primary legal
duty" owed the plaintiff appears too broad a rule for applica-
tion to other factual situations.16 Moreover, courts always find
a duty to prevent a certain type of invasion of an interest when
they are willing to afford it protection. When in the instant
case the court allowed recovery for mental anguish occasioned
by injury to plaintiffs' child, it determined that a duty did
exist to avoid negligently causing mental anguish by injury
to another. To say that this determination can be reconciled, on
the finding of a "primary legal duty" owed directly to plain-
tiffs, with the rule that precludes recovery for mental anguish
negligently occasioned by injury to another seems a subterfuge.' 7
The instant case differs from prior Louisiana jurisprudence
on recovery for mental anguish in two respects: it authorizes
recovery for negligently inflicted mental anguish unaccompanied
by physical consequences in a case other than one involving
desecration of a corise or faulty transmission of a telegraph
15. 135 So. 2d at 159.
16. Although the court maintains that the rule is not to be understood as
embracing third persons in general, it would seem that the rule would in fact
extend to such persons. Consider the situation where A, a motorist, loses control
of his automobile and strikes B, a pedestrian. C, another pedestrian, is nearby
but in such a position that he does not fear for his own safety. However, being
very sensitive to the sufferings of others, C suffers mental anguish because of the
injury to B. Almost all authorities would agree that A should not be held for 0'8
mental anguish. See notes 6 and 14 supra. However, since C was also a pedes-i
trian it is evident that A breached a "primary legal duty" owed him, i.e., the
duty to be careful. Consequently, the holding of the instant case would dictate
that he be held liable. But in this hypothetical situation the accepted duty to
C to be careful is the duty to be careful so that he does not physically injure G,
and not so that he will not cause mental anguish to him by injury to B.
17. See PROSSER, TORTS §§ 38, 47, 48 (2d ed. 1955) ; Prosser, Palsgraf Re-
visited, 52 Mi6H. L. REv. 1 (1953), reprinted in PROSSER, SELECTED ToPIcs Oi'
THE LAW OF TORTS 191 (1954) ; Comment, 16 LA. L. REv. 391 (1956). .... : I
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NOTES
message,18 and it authorizes recovery for negligently inflicted
mental anguish occasioned by injury to another. 19 It would seem
that, in determining the wisdom of allowing recovery in such
instances, consideration should be given the previously men-
tioned factors underlying the limitations on recovery for mental
anguish- the possibility of plaintiffs recovering for false and
excessive claims, and the imposition of an unreasonable burden
upon socially desirable activities such as traffic and transporta-
tion. Confined to its facts,20 the rule of the instant case seems
desirable. It is submitted, however, that if extended to the field
of torts in general it could create formidable problems of ad-
ministration.
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr.
18. Louisiana courts, as mentioned earlier, also allow recovery for mental dis-
tress without physical manifestations in some instances when it is occasioned by
breach of contract. See note 11 supra. As stated previously, the statements made
by Louisiana courts appear to be misleading. As to actual recoveries, see note
11 supra.
19. It is submitted that this is the effect of the holding of the instant case.
See text accompanying note 17 supra.
20. I.e., parents suffering mental anguish for fear of death to their child as a
result of an exterminator's failure to be able to inform them of the nature of
the poisons used in their home.
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